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“Back to a Past that Was Futuristic”: The Alt-Right and the Uncanny Form of Racism 
 
There are reduced expectations for the younger 
generation, and this is the first time this has happened 
in American history. Even if there are aspects of Trump 
that are retro and that seem to be going back to the past, 
I think a lot of people want to go back to a past that was 
futuristic — The Jetsons, Star Trek. They’re dated but 
futuristic. 
-Peter Thiel, quoted in Dowd (2017) 
 
In the scramble to explain Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential 
election, then-campaign chief executive Stephen K. Bannon’s claim to a Mother Jones 
reporter that Breitbart under his editorship was a “platform for the alt-right” (Posner 
2016) generated widespread attention in mainstream media publications.1  A rash of alt-
right “explainers” appeared that attempted to familiarize the uninitiated with this so-
called movement by outlining the obscure intellectual roots of the alt-right’s seemingly 
inscrutable meme-driven cultural politics. This paper begins from the premise that the alt-
right is not a movement but a reactionary ideology, a “bursting forth of anti-PC cultural 
politics,” better understood as an ideological “milieu” rather than a movement (Nagle, 
2017: 19, 18). Through an analysis of alt-right meme practice and neoreactionary theory, 
I will show in what follows that the intellectual innovation of the alt-right and its 
neoreactionary co-travelers is to attach white identity politics to a critique of modernity 
that turns postcolonialism on its head. Where the latter attacks racism for compromising 
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the democratic promise, the former attacks democracy for compromising the white race’s 
promise, which is to accelerate capitalism to the lost Hobbesian future of the CEO-King, 
a vision implied in Peter Thiel’s words quoted in the epigraph to this article. 
Neoreactionaries have resurrected nineteenth-century notions of racial degenerationism 
and race as civilizational index, sutured them to techno-futurism, and deployed this 
monstrous racist hybrid in the form of left and postcolonial critiques of modernity. The 
components of this thinking are familiar, but this precise combination is novel. The 
intellectual and aesthetic practice of the alt-right can thus be described as uncanny: 
strange but entirely familiar, a return in the present of a repressed past. My argument, in 
short, is that the alt-right’s newness is in fact a symptom of its oldness.  
This argument draws on Corey Robin’s (2013) analysis of two key features of 
reactionary ideology, which, Robin argues, seeks to restore a lost past to a fallen present, 
and does so precisely by attacking the present on its own terms. This reactionary war 
against contemporary culture therefore tends to assume the aesthetic form of this 
culture—an immanent critique from the right that attacks the present culture to restore a 
past it has lost. Adopting Robin's framework, I examine the attack on the present in the 
form of alt-right meme culture and the neoreactionary proposal for restoring a lost past. 
Neoreactionaries have a name for the structure of the fallen present: the “Cathedral,” the 
term Curtis Yarvin (writing as the blogger Mencius Moldbug) coined to describe the 
academics and mainstream journalists who preach the official “faith” of political 
correctness (2008). The notion bears resemblance to the  
“propaganda model” (Herman and Chomsky 1988) of mass media, but instead of 
mainstream media and academia colluding with capital, they are preventing its 
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flourishing. In its broad contours if not in its politics, this “Cathedral” critique resonates 
with left critiques of identity politics and diversity discourse, both of which are central to 
what Jodi Dean calls “communicative capitalism,” or the form of capitalism that captures 
resistance by materializing practices of agency, participation, and diversity in 
communication technologies (Dean 2002, 2009). Left academics therefore find 
themselves united with corporate capital around “enthusiasm for diversity, multiplicity, 
and the agency of consumers” (Dean 2009: 9), a state of affairs that has led many on the 
left to call for a rejection of identity politics. Hence Nagle, in her important if 
controversial work on the emerging reactionary ideologies, argues that the alt-right 
opposes “the new identity politics” of liberal online spaces like the social blogging 
network Tumblr that normalize “anti-male, anti-white, anti-straight, anti-cis rhetoric” on 
the “cultural left” (Nagle 2017: 68). I want to suggest here, though, that whatever the 
merits of identity politics as a scholarly approach or political strategy might be, the alt-
right critique of identity politics is only the first reactionary gesture—the immanent 
critique of the present. The second move—the restoration of the lost past—does far more 
than violate the terms of diversity discourse; it seeks to install race as an interface that 
gathers humans in a global frame and sorts them hierarchically. Mobilizing memes as the 
aesthetic form of reaction, the alt-right popularizes this racial interface. Richard 
Spencer’s slogan—“race is real, race matters, race is the foundation of identity”—seek to 
formalize racism as a political strategy, appropriating diversity discourse to claim white 
nationalism as a protected identity formation. Racist exclusion is the fulcrum of the 
proposed political order. 
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 The uncanny is a useful figure for analyzing the reactionary attempt to restore a 
lost past. This formal racism is uncanny in the strict sense Freud (2003 [1919]) defines 
the term: the appearance of “something long familiar” that was estranged “only through 
being repressed” (148).  The appearance of this estranged object motivates ideological 
attempts to “integrate the uncanny” and “assign it a place” in a fallen present (Dolar 
1991: 19). By focusing on the alt-right’s immanent critique of identity politics, we allow 
the alt-right to direct us to the “place” in the fallen present that needs critiquing, all the 
while missing the lost past that the alt-right seeks to restore. As a figure of encounter with 
the present, the uncanny directs us to the formal practice of assigning a place. I will begin 
with the first reactionary gesture—immanent critique—by examining the meme as a 
formal manifestation of what Dean calls communicative capitalism, and therefore as an 
entirely familiar form, even if the content of alt-right memes is bizarre. I will then turn to 
the second reactionary gesture—the restoration of the lost past—by turning to the 
intellectual roots of the alt-right, focusing on Bannon’s summer of 2014 speech at a 
Vatican conference and its resonance with the neoreactionary thinkers Mencius Moldbug 
and Nick Land, whose form of uncanny racism I will describe. The connection extends 
beyond shared sympathy: Yarvin’s start-up counts the Trump-supporting Thiel as an 
investor (Pein 2014), and Yarvin reportedly communicated through an intermediary with 
Bannon while the latter was still Trump’s Chief of Staff (Johnson and Stokols 2017).I 
conclude by suggesting how attention to ideological form makes it possible to critique 
reactionary ideology without replicating the first reactionary gesture and arriving at the 
same place of critique that reactionary ideology selects, a danger that haunts any attempt 
to contextualize reaction. 
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First, a brief note on terminology: the alt-right is a contested term, but is best 
understood as a shorthand for anti-politically correct reactionary ideology that developed 
its meme aesthetic in message boards, particularly 4chan (see Nagle 2017: 12, 19). 
Neoreactionary thinking is a specific intellectual tradition that influences many alt-right 
adherents. This paper does not seek to define the alt-right, and indeed such definitional 
questions tend to impose a misreading of the alt-right as a coherent movement rather than 
a reactionary ideology. Nor does this paper deny the existence of extreme right 
organization (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Berlet 2004); rather, it seeks to analyze the 
“metapolitics” (Lyons 2017) of an ideological “fascist creep” (Ross 2017).  
 
Memes and the Allegorical Interface 
After Trump’s 2016 victory, alt-right partisans began claiming the election as a 
turning point in a meme war that most mainstream audiences nevertheless knew little 
about until mainstream journalists began publishing “explainers” on the subject.  A 
journalistic genre of recent vintage, the “explainer” responds to the perpetual news and 
commentary stream by expanding the nut graph into a contextual framework for 
understanding complex or obscure issues, stories or trends, allowing those who find 
themselves “out of the loop” to “grasp the whole” of the story (Rosen 2008). The alt-
right, with its cornucopia of obscure memes and references—from the mystical “meme 
magic” of the pseudo-religious Cult of Kek (more on this below) to the infamous Pepe 
the Frog to racist approximation of African American Vernacular English of “dindu 
nuffin”—would seem to demand the explainer treatment, particularly for those who 
discovered the alt-right only after Trump’s hiring of Bannon brought the alt-right to 
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mainstream attention. As I will show below, mainstream explainers tend to attempt to 
uncover the ostensibly obscure symbolism of alt-right memes. Before turning to the 
explainers, though, it is necessary to attend to the meme and its function in reactionary 
ideology. The critical impulse is to reveal that which ideology conceals, but the alt-right 
does not conceal its racism; there is no cover (Topinka 2017). Instead, there is an attempt 
to repurpose the form of communicative capitalism to critique the present. As a form, the 
meme is ideally suited to such a task. The meme form encourages inclusion, 
participation, and bricolage—all the tools once associated with emancipatory politics and 
now absorbed into communicative capitalism. In this sense, the meme offers a perfect 
reactionary tool: reappropriative in its form, it reacts against the present by repurposing 
it.   
Indeed, the meme is a privileged form of communicative capitalism; it is an 
allegory of exchange, where culture exits only to be repurposed, and where the symbolic 
submits to circulation. Although their content may appear obscure, the form of alt-right 
memes is entirely familiar; in this sense, they are uncanny allegories of communicative 
capitalism.  Building on and contesting the media formalism of Lev Manovich and the 
hard media determinism of Friedrich Kittler, Alexander Galloway’s (2012) recent work 
on control allegories argues that media cannot be reduced to their technical predicates—
storing, transmitting, and processing—or understood as “objects” bearing a set of formal 
characteristics that afford certain determinant effects. Galloway (2012) proposes the 
notion of the “interface” to examine media as forms that inaugurate sets of practices. 
Mediation is therefore a “process-object” (46), a space of flow, transformation, and 
transition where the “inside” of technical media encounters the “outside” of the social 
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world. This encounter between technical media and social technique is, for Galloway, an 
allegory of how contemporary power works: technical apparatuses tend to encourage sets 
of practices that produce a flexible, modular, and endlessly transformable form of power. 
A technical apparatus might encourage a reactionary response as well. Consider Urbit, 
the “personal sever” created by Curtis Yarvin, also known as Moldbug, the 
neoreactionary blogger. The Urbit interface inserts an “opaque layer” between the user 
and the combination of cloud services users rely on (Wolfe-Pauly). Rather than 
outsourcing computing to cloud services, Urbit offers general purpose personal server 
that “holds your data; runs your apps; wrangles your connected devices; and defines your 
secure identity” (Wolfe-Pauley). Urbit seeks to reclaim the sovereignty that Benjamin 
Bratton (2016) argues has been vested in “the Stack” of computing and cloud services 
(particularly Facebook, Google, and Amazon) that now comprise planetary-scale 
computation. As creators Galen Wolfe-Pauly and Yarvin suggest, Urbit restores digital 
independence and reclaims sovereignty by returning to users exclusive control over their 
data. Instead of more participatory culture—“toiling on Mark Zuckerberg’s content farm” 
(Yarvin, quoted in Lecher 2017)—Urbit offers what neoreactionaries call “exit.” It is 
software as an allegory for the neoreactionary age.  
The meme form relies on participation from users competent in digital remixing. 
To meme is to participate through reappropriation. Scholars have tended to read this 
participatory reappropriation as democratizing and politically liberating (Coleman 
2014)—even, at times, when meme practice becomes explicitly racist (Phillips 2015: 
97).2 Yet moving too quickly from technique to politics risks misunderstanding both. 
Amidst the recent attention in mainstream culture given to memes forged on the website 
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4chan’s message boards, it is also tempting to claim that “4chan invented the meme as we 
use it today” (Beran 2017). However, the meme form emerges from message board 
formats rather than any particular community. Börzsei (2013) thus traces the meme’s 
genealogy to Usenet, where meme use signals familiarity with message board discourse 
and offers a means of performing digital competence. Memes emerge from a 
constellation of interfaces—photo editors, image hosting sites, meme generators for 
image macro memes, and message boards—that encourage exchange, appropriation, and 
repurposing. As such, the meme is an allegory for communicative capitalism, which does 
not capture each instance of resistance through cultural reappropriation so much as engulf 
resistance in its very form.  
Memes function through deixis: they signal location in a culture, relying on in-
group agreement for understanding.  The meme operates through the digital media 
aesthetics of the “stream” (Lovink 2016), where the signaling of links in circulatory 
networks replaces symbolic representation. This accounts for the uncanny familiarity of 
alt-right memes, since their obscurity requires laborious explanation to “understand;” that 
is, of course, unless one already knows the references. But the obscurity to outsiders is a 
basic function of the meme form itself. Consider the “Most Interesting Man in the 
World” meme, an example of the image macro, which in turn provides the basic grammar 
for the meme: an image, typically drawn from popular culture, is overlaid with text, 
which itself typically references popular culture or tropes from internet culture (the image 
might be also be drawn from a viral video, but, as Shiffman (2011) argues, something 
that “goes viral” does not become a meme unless it becomes the subject of imitation and 
transformation). 
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This meme imitates the performed cultural sophistication of the “most interesting man” 
but transforms it to apply to internet culture, where no geek would be caught using 
Internet Explorer. Even such a banal meme as this requires some familiarity with a range 
of cultural discourses and figures: the “Silver Fox,” the Latin lover, and geek culture. 
This meme is as strange as any alt-right meme, and equally void of symbolism. It is a 
tethering of cultural domains, the formal manifestation of the reappropriation that 
dominates internet culture and communicative capitalism. By ignoring the meme form, 
the explainers approach the alt-right as inscrutable, when in fact the alt-right practices a 
vernacular aesthetic form. To be sure, alt-right memes rely on a relatively esoteric 
referential repertoire, but the form in which this repertoire appears—the meme, an 
allegorical form of communicative capitalism—is entirely familiar.  
 
The Alt-Right Explainer 
Capitalizing on Breitbart’s connection to Trump through Bannon, Allum Bokhari 
and Milo Yiannopolous (2016) published “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the 
Alt-Right” on Breitbart, an article that helped establish the generic conventions for the 
alt-right explainer: ride the momentum of the tenuous links between the alt-right and 
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Donald Trump, identify the intellectual base (including neoreactionaries, especially 
Moldbug), point up the contrast with two of the main wings of mainstream American 
conservatism (anti-globalization, anti-theocracy), and demystify “meme magic” by 
explaining what memes—especially Pepe the Frog—mean. Similar explainers soon 
echoed in the nave of the “Cathedral.” The Daily Wire, the Weekly Standard, the 
National Review, Vox, and the New York Times published explainers following 
Breitbart’s pattern, as did the neo-Nazi Daily Stormer. Citing the left’s purported culture 
war victory, the Weekly Standard claims that the alt-right’s racism is merely a rhetorical 
response to the “left’s moralism” (Welton 2015), and the New York Times explainer (an 
op-ed by Christopher Caldwell, a senior editor at the Weekly Standard) emphasizes that 
alt-right racism is partly a result of the undue expansion of what it means to be “racist” 
(Caldwell 2016), an expansion Caldwell redresses by carefully distinguishing malignant 
white supremacists from the purportedly more benign white nationalists. In the face of 
such prevarication, the Daily Stormer’s “Normies’ guide to the alt-right” makes for 
bracing reading (Anglin 2016). Although it follows the generic conventions Breitbart 
established, it rejects the latter as a latecomer, claims racism as the fundamental fulcrum 
of alt-right ideology, and calls racist trolling a form of “culture-jamming” directed 
against so-called “normie” culture (Anglin 2016). The Daily Stormer, unfortunately, sees 
things more clearly than the “Cathedral” on this score. This racist trolling takes form in 
the meme, which becomes a mechanism of ideological assault and community-building.   
Hillary Clinton’s campaign famously responded to one such meme—shared most 
prominently by Donald Trump, Jr. and Roger Stone—that featured a photoshopped film 
poster for The Expendables, retitled as “The Deplorables,” with the original actors’ heads 
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replaced with a number of prominent Trump supporters during the 2016 presidential 
campaign: Roger Stone, Ben Carson, Chris Christie, Eric Trump, Mike Pence, Rudy 
Giuliani, Donald Trump, Jr., Alex Jones, and Milo Yiannopolous. Trump is the central 
figure in the image. Hovering over his left soldier, Pepe the Frog looks smugly on, his 
red-blond hair coiffed in Trump’s signature style (Chan 2016). The photoshopping is 
clumsy, and the film referenced is archetypical Hollywood mediocrity, but to explain this 
meme is to marvel at the range of discourses it summons: from the visual and textual pun 
on The Expendables—which is in turn a play on Clinton’s dismissal of Trump supporters 
as belonging in the “basket of deplorables”—to the visual enrollment in Trump’s 
campaign of Pepe the Frog himself, whose bizarre internet career has by now been 
thoroughly chronicled.3 The meme sutures a complex intertextual tissue, with each 
reference signaled on the aesthetic surface of the meme.  
The explainer genre encourages a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Ricoeur 1970) 
that seeks to wrest some underlying meaning from the meme. The Clinton campaign 
formalizes its explainer of this meme as a question-and-answer session between the 
innocent and the knowing: “Who is that frog standing directly behind Trump? / That’s 
Pepe. He’s a symbol associated with white supremacy.  / Wait. Really? White 
supremacy?” (Chan 2016). The dialogue falls into the trap of attempting to demystify 
Pepe. The Clinton campaign approaches the meme with a surface-depth aesthetic model, 
asking what the meme symbolizes, and this representational reading misrecognizes the 
meme form. As a result, the explainers fail to reckon with the uncanny familiarity of 
these ostensibly obscure aesthetic forms. As is often the case in critical theory, the 
explainer positions the audience as the innocent questioner in the Clinton campaign’s 
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explainer—What? Really? A white supremacist frog? The alt-right is truly esoteric! 
Hence the headline of the New York Times explainer: “What the Alt-right Really Means” 
(Caldwell 2016). Or the Vox headline for its explainer: “The alt-right is way more than 
warmed-over white supremacy. It’s that, but way way weirder” (Matthews 2016). Or 
from the Huffington Post: “My Journey to the Center of the Alt-right” (O’Brien 2016). 
These headlines suggest that the alt-right’s racist ideology is obscure (even though it has 
always been a feature of American politics) and that its aesthetic practices are inscrutable 
(even though the meme is a primary aesthetic form of participatory media). Thus the 
Weekly Standard blames the alt-right on the “left’s moralism” and the New York Times 
diagnoses the undue expansion of the meaning of “racist” as the cause of the alt-right’s 
reactionary politics. By failing to reckon with aesthetics of the meme form, these 
“explainers” unwittingly redeem “meme magic” and its racist politics as something 
obscure and inscrutable rather than familiar and intractable.    
As an allegorical form of communicative capitalism and the aesthetics of the 
“stream” (Lovink 2016), the meme operates by signaling links—including to racist 
subcultural formations—rather than by encoding symbolic representation. Updating for 
the digital age Richard Dawkins’s 1972 notion of memes as the genetic expression, 
selection, and variation of cultural units, Limor Shiffman (2011) offers a rigorous 
definition of memes as “building blocks” of complex cultures that propagate quickly, 
reproducing through imitation and transformation (189). A form of Henry Jenkins’s 
“spreadable media” (Jenkins et al 2013), memes exist in circulation, transforming 
through “remixes” (Wiggins and Bowers 2015) that blend cultural domains and generate 
the meme’s circulatory momentum. This remixing and repurposing wrenches objects 
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from their cultural domain, creating a new, thickly referential memetic context. The 
meme is thus a form that transforms in circulation. To “get” the meme, one has to 
recognize both the cultural domain the meme references and how the meme is dislocating 
that cultural domain. Although memes are thickly referential, with dizzyingly complex 
circulatory histories, they are not typically rich hermeneutic texts. They signal and enact 
cultural convergence, but they do not symbolize it. Hence the awkwardness of the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” the Clinton campaign brings to Pepe. Those who use Pepe in 
white supremacist memes do not smuggle him is a covert symbol. His appearance signals 
a trajectory of transformation in circulation, not a symbolic repertoire. The Clinton 
campaign is thus right to associate Pepe with white supremacy but wrong about the 
meme, which signals circulation without symbolizing. 
By “unmasking” political correctness as the true cause of racism, mainstream 
explainers follow the first reactionary gesture, repeating the contours of the reactionary 
immanent critique. In a widely shared Medium post, Dale Beran claims that Pepe, the 
“grotesque, frowning, sleepy eyed, out of shape, swamp dweller, peeing with his pants 
pulled down because-it-feels-good-man frog” represents in an ideology that “steers into 
the skid of its own patheticness. Pepe symbolizes embracing your loserdom, owning it” 
(Beran 2017). This attempt at a hermeneutics of Pepe ignores that the alt-right does not 
make memes out of the “feels good man” Pepe; the alt-right Pepe wears a smug smile, 
openly declaring his troll status. Such a pathos-laden reading of “steering into the skid” 
shares with Laurie Penny’s (2017) reading of Yiannopolous’s followers as duped “Lost 
Boys” a tendency to position the “loser” status of the geek (the archetypal perpetual 
virgin housed in his parents’ basement) as an alibi for misogyny and white nationalism. 
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Indeed, Beran claims the left’s “radical idea of sexual-difference-as-illusion,” which is 
“meant to solve the deplorables’ problem” by “dispelling it as a cloud of pure ideas” is in 
fact an “Orwellian” declaration to “these powerless men” that “‘There’s no such thing as 
your problem!’” (Beran 2017). Beran’s critique here echoes Nagle’s criticism of the 
“anti-male, anti-white, anti-straight, anti-cis rhetoric” on the “cultural left” (Nagle 2017: 
68). It is certainly possible to criticize such rhetoric, and reflexivity is surely a crucial 
political practice. But it is also notable that these critiques replicate the reactionary 
gesture: the left has won the culture war, diversity is ascendant, and the straight cisgender 
white male has lost his position—political correctness is everywhere run amok. The left 
therefore becomes the cause of the alt-right, and alt-right’s reactionary thinking becomes 
justified, if misguided. Indeed, these “Lost Boys,” dispossessed by the regime of political 
correctness, have also lost agency, and their hateful meme magic is a mere symptom of 
this fall. The critical impulse is to unmask the discourse by assigning it a context, but this 
is precisely its weakness in its approach to reactionary ideology. The alt-right’s blatantly 
racist discourse offers little to unmask. Its esoteric memes turn out to be banal cultural 
references. Unmasking its discourse tend to replicate the first reactionary gesture by 
arriving at the same place—the same cultural context—to be targeted for immanent 
critique.  
 
Reactionary Critical Theory 
I turn now to the second reactionary gesture—the restoration of the lost past. Alt-
right and neoreactionary racism is uncanny—old and out of place, yet entirely familiar. 
Attending to the uncanny as a figure of ideology—an attempt to assign a place to that 
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which is out of place—allows an approach to reactionary ideology that does not replicate 
the gesture of its immanent critique.  
Neoreactionary ideology tends to adopt the form and style of critical theory. Of 
course, neoreactionary thinker Nick Land was once a celebrated academic critical 
theorist, particularly in the UK, where he became something of a cult figure for his “dark 
Deleuzian” capitalist accelerationism and experimental theory-fiction, which he 
developed as part of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit at the University of Warwick 
in the 1990s.4 The infamous reactionary blogger Mencius Moldbug also offers a critical 
genealogy of modernity on his Unqualified Reservations blog, particularly in the 
fourteen-part “Open Letter to Open-Minded Progressives.” Land’s “Dark Enlightenment” 
text attempts to formalize Moldbug’s prolific if rambling blogposts into a neoreactionary 
theory of capitalist acceleration grounded in a despotic sovereign political order. 
Moldbug and Land follow the form of a left and postcolonial critique of modernity, but 
turn the critique on its head: the modern promise of equality and democracy was not 
compromised (by slavery, colonialism, and capitalism); the promise is itself the 
compromise that prevents capitalism’s flourishing. Modern notions of equality legitimate 
any grievance as oppression, and democracy compels the state to recompense any 
grievance claim. Democracy and equality therefore combine to promote personal failure. 
Neoreaction seeks to replace democratic voice with exit, or the right to leave any polity at 
any time, and to restore sovereignty in the figure of a CEO-King who seeks only to 
maximize value and therefore to accelerate capitalism. Race serves a crucial function in 
this theory: ministered to by the “Cathedral,” race mediates between citizens and state, 
sanctioning grievance claims and incentivizing dysfunction. However, by properly 
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reprogramming race through neo-eugenics rather than modern notions of equality, it 
could become the accelerationist motor capable of restoring the lost future of capitalist 
sovereignty before its corruption through enforced diversity.  
The obsession with restoring lost ethnic sovereignty links the more abstruse 
neoreactionary thinkers with populists such as Bannon, who also adopt the form of left 
critique to advance reactionary thinking. Although Bannon’s status as a political star did 
not long outlive his tenure in Trump’s White House, which ended on August 18, 2017, he 
remains a pivotal figure for his role in linking the openly fascist politics of figures like 
Aleksander Dugin and Julius Evola with mainstream political discourse. In his 2014 
speech to a conference in the Vatican, Bannon channels left critical theory, citing Marx in 
a critique of the “Objectivist School of libertarian capitalism,” which seeks to “make 
people commodities, to objectify people” (Bannon, quoted in Feder 2016). Identifying a 
“crisis in the underpinnings of capitalism,” he diagnoses the post-crash bailout as 
symptomatic of a system that favors elites over the working classes (Bannon, quoted in 
Feder 2016). As a reactionary, though, Bannon proposes to rescue the future by restoring 
the past. Bannon praises Vladimir Putin, and his “advisor [Aleksander Dugin] who 
harkens back to Julius Evola” for “standing up for traditional institutions” and national 
sovereignty (Bannon, quoted in Feder 2016). Acknowledging Evola’s fascism, Bannon 
nevertheless argues that “people want to see sovereignty for their country, they want to 
see nationalism” and a return to the time of America’s founding when “freedoms were 
controlled at a local level” rather than by elites in global command centers such as New 
York, London, and Berlin (Bannon, quoted in Feder 2016). Bannon’s thinking here 
precisely follows the reactionary paradigm Robin outlines: Bannon develops a withering 
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critique of the present order—one that overlaps in places with left critiques of finance 
capital—and offers as a solution the restoration of a fallen order.5 Although they distance 
themselves from populist fascists like Bannon, Land and Moldbug share the same 
reactionary preoccupation. Land’s systematization of Moldbug sketches a program for 
fulfilling Bannon’s desire for sovereignty. This program relies on race as a formal 
explanatory category—a mode of immanent critique—and an interface that ran 
reconfigure the political order, assigning a place for the lost future of the CEO-King. 
 
The Cathedral and History 
 As I have argued, following Robin (2013), reactionary politics combines two 
gestures: first, an immanent critique of the present, and second, a call to restore a lost 
past. This impulse surfaces in racist meme culture, but it receives a more rigorous 
treatment in Land and Moldbug, both of whom wage a critique of the present in service 
of a resurrection of the past. I turn now to the neoreactionary “Cathedral” critique—the 
first reactionary gesture—in order to show how it sanctions a call for a return in the 
present to neo-Victorian racism—the second reactionary gesture. 
Land and Moldbug are profoundly lapsarian thinkers. For them, progressivism—
the conspiracy the “Cathedral” sustains—is the fall that obscures and indeed encourages 
the degeneration of the races. Land (2013) argues that the progressive Enlightenment 
follows the “logical perversity” of “Hegel’s dialectic,” enforcing the “egalitarian moral 
ideal” through progressivism’s sustaining formula: “tolerance is tolerable” and 
“intolerance is intolerable.” This formal structure guarantees a “positive right to be 
tolerated, defined ever more expansively as substantial entitlement” (Land 2013). If 
  
18 
progressivism is the fall, tolerance is the juggernaut that tramples any attempt at ascent. 
For Land, the American Civil War is a moment of original sin that that “cross-coded the 
practical question of the Leviathan with (black/white) racial dialectics” (Land 2013). Of 
the Civil War, Land writes:   
The moral coherence of the Union cause required that the founders were 
reconceived as politically illegitimate white patriarchal slave-owners, and 
American history combusted in progressive education and the culture wars. If 
independence is the ideology of the slave-holders, emancipation requires the 
programmatic destruction of independence. Within a cross-coded history, the 
realization of freedom is indistinguishable from its abolition. (Land 2013) 
 
The Civil War thus installs a “cross-coded” history running on parallel historical tracks 
between progressive and dark enlightenments, emancipation and independence, voice and 
exit. This genealogy allows Land to identify a formal mechanism that propels the “only 
tolerance is tolerable” formula of the Progressive Enlightenment. The anachronistic 
insertion of “progressive education” and the “culture wars” into the stakes of the Civil 
War does not trouble Land because his analysis is formal rather than historical: the 
“cross-coded” history leads inexorably to progressivism, which in turn functions as a 
transhistorical epistemological and ontological force. Hence Moldbug claims, bizarrely, 
that Harvard’s “progressive” curriculum has not changed in 200 years, that British 
politics has been moving steadily left for 150 years, and that progressives—among whom 
he includes all mainstream Western politicians—have no enemies to the left (Moldbug 
2008).  
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The “Cathedral” conspiracy therefore assigns a context for reaction. If 
neoreactionary thinking appears to be out of place, it is only because of the long reign of 
progressive dogma. The reactionary desire for a lost past follows close behind. Moldbug 
thus routinely cites the pre-1922 texts available on Google Books to pierce the 
“Cathedral” veil, approvingly linking, for example, to Nehemiah Adams’ 1860 account of 
his trip to the south, where he found himself surprised to find the slaves “were all in good 
humor, and some of them in a broad laugh” and charmed by the “unbought” friendliness 
of slaves (Adams 1854). Elaborating on the dubious claim that the “neat thing about 
primary sources is that often, it only takes one to prove your point,” Moldbug brags that 
high school students “won’t be assigned the primary sources I just linked to” (Moldbug 
2008c). He cites the same source in a post defending and indeed advocating Thomas 
Carlyle’s view on slavery, suggesting that those who view slavery as “intrinsically evil” 
would “quickly change their tunes if forced,” like Adams, “to function in an actual slave 
society” (Moldbug 2009). The “Cathedral” conspiracy excuses Moldbug from evaluating 
Adams’ account. If high school students wouldn’t be assigned it, that’s only because it 
violates “Cathedral” dogma. And since Adams’ account predates the Civil War (though 
not Enlightenment itself), it is therefore more likely to see the truth before the fall. 
Piercing the mists of this transhistorical progressivism, we see that “Not all humans are 
born the same, of course, and the innate character and intelligence of some is more suited 
to mastery than slavery. For others, it is more suited to slavery” (Moldbug 2009). To take 
the measure of these aptitudes, Moldbug turns to an uncanny form of racism that 
functions as an interface for gathering and sorting human populations.  
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Race as Interface 
 Land and Moldbug accept race as a means of categorizing human aptitude within 
a global hierarchy. This notion of race plays a crucial role in their thinking, which 
describes the following racial dynamic: Insofar as progressivism incentivizes inaptitude, 
it also encourages racial degeneration. This is race as a technology, as Wendy Chun 
(2009) has described: race has particular affordances for enframing human populations, 
and this enframing shapes the contours of social and political orders. Extending 
Galloway, this is race as interface, as a form that gathers humans into a global frame and 
sorts them hierarchically (see also Weheliye 2014). 
 Land and Moldbug’s uncanny racism resurrects a notion of race as an interface for 
gathering and sorting global populations first deployed by late Victorian eugenics. Like 
the eugenicists, Land and Moldbug rely on race as a mean of categorizing humans based 
on their biologically determined aptitude.  In 1869, Francis Galton called this aptitude 
“hereditary genius,” and offered it as a scientific explanation for the advance of certain 
civilizations over others, with Europeans, of course, at the apex of racial hierarchy 
(Galton 1869). Land and Moldbug adopt a range of figures (although no trained 
geneticists) who argue for “human biodiversity,” which includes the relatively banal 
argument that humans are not neurologically uniform coupled with the dubious and 
insidious claim that this “biodiversity” can be best measured by plotting genetically-
determined racial categories to IQ distribution.6 Yarvin makes this argument without his 
typical circumlocution in a Medium post (which he later deleted) that attempted to 
persuade delegates at the LambdaConf functional programming conference against 
boycotting his presence because of his slavery apologetics (Breitbart sympathetically 
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chronicled Yarvin’s plight).7 Yarvin insists he does not equate “anatomical traits” with 
“moral superiority” but makes the explicit argument for a genetically determined racial 
hierarchy as measured by IQ in the comments section of the Medium post (Yarvin 2016). 
Here Yarvin is trying to speak to what Moldbug would call the “Cathedral,” defending 
himself from committing the moral sin of racism as the bad ideology of individual 
viewpoints. He also criticizes mass incarceration—the first reactionary gesture. Yet 
Yarvin also summons race in its uncanny neo-eugenicist form to suggest that “Malik 
cannot be magically turned into a Jewish math nerd” (Yarvin 2016). This is the second 
gesture, a proposal that neo-eugenicist racism can explain and resolve the problem of 
mass incarceration and “the destruction of African American society” (Yarvin 2016). 
 Another crucial connection between neoreaction and Victorian racism is the use of 
race not only to categorize humans by aptitude, but also to plot the potential for 
civilizational achievement. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty offers a canonical description of 
Victorian Liberal conceptions of the hierarchy of races, which Mill leverages to justify 
violent repression in India: savages cannot “practise the forebearance” that “civilized 
society” demands, and they therefore require “despotic” governance to restore 
sovereignty and subdue passions (209). Land’s claim that Europeans are genetically 
predisposed to “low time preference” is formally indistinguishable from Mill’s 
preoccupation with forbearance. However, neoreaction reverses the racial trajectory. For 
liberal Victorian racial theorists, exposure to Enlightenment civilization could advance a 
given race beyond savagery. Land’s neoreaction reverses this trajectory: the exposure to 
Enlightenment formula that “only tolerance is tolerable”  encourages further dysfunction 
in the lower races. This argument adopts another strain of Victorian racism: racial 
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degenerationism, or the notion that races could devolve to be increasingly ill suited to 
civilization. Racial degenerationism found practical application in criminal atavism, the 
theory that criminals resembled “prehistoric man” and behaved “in a way that would be 
appropriate to savage societies” (Ellis 1890: 208). Adopting a similar assumption, Land 
suggests that “barbarism has been normalized,” in “lethally menacing” cities where 
“civilization has fundamentally collapsed” (Land 2013). Indulging in racist moral panic 
about urban decay—another anachronism in this age of urban “revitalization”—Moldbug 
argues that most American cities would benefit from martial law, and Land (2013) 
identifies white flight as the “spontaneous impulse of the dark enlightenment”: it is all 
exit and no voice. Land’s investment in white flight is also a libidinal investment in the 
fear of violently virile black bodies, which finds its parallel in the alt-right’s obsession 
with cuckoldry and “cucking” racialized as a white man watching his white wife 
dominated by a “black bull.” The purposefully excessive “cuck” discourse offers a means 
of indulging the fear of the black body while at the same time enjoying the act of 
violating tenets of “Cathedral” faith. The crucial point, though, is that “cuck” discourse 
not only operates to critique political correctness; it also signals an understanding of race 
as interface for governance, that which promotes degeneration but also—properly 
reprogrammed—promises acceleration to a lost future. 
 
Conclusion 
  Before an antifa (anti-fascist) protestor sucker-punched Richard Spencer in the 
face in Washington, D.C. on Trump’s inauguration day—a moment that quickly achieved 
meme status—a bystander asked Spencer if he liked black people. Spencer smirked, 
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shrugged, and said, “Sure.” Identity politics poses a double trap for approaching the alt-
right: Criticize the alt-right for bad identity politics, and they can easily dodge the 
accusation by parroting mainstream acceptance of diversity discourse, or point to the fact 
that political correctness is mainstream and therefore part of the power structure that so 
clearly needs dismantling. Criticize identity politics, and cede to the alt-right the choice 
of battleground. I have argued here that alt-right critics tend to make just such a 
concession. By focusing on the first gesture—the immanent critique—we risk missing the 
form of reactionary ideology, which includes a call for restoring a lost past. Spencer 
attempts to distill this call into a slogan: “race is real, race matters, race is the foundation 
of identity.” This slogan adapts Land and Moldbug’s racial formalism, but instead of an 
exit from grievance democracy, it argues for inclusion within grievance status. Hence 
Moldbug’s (2007) coy refusal of white nationalism: “I’m not exactly allergic to the 
stuff,” he writes, but white nationalists only recognize the symptom, missing the cure. 
The critique of “cucks” and the obsession with “red-pilling” offers a more nakedly 
libidinal, pop cultural take on the “Cathedral,” but, according to Moldbug, the alt-right 
fails to recognize that the entitlement state cannot expand to include white nationalist 
grievance, because to do so would violate “Cathedral” dogma. Bannon’s strong 
sovereignty more closely approaches the cure, but insofar as nationalism entails 
protectionism, he fails to follow techno-futurism back to the futuristic past that 
neoreactionaries desire. 
Land proposes as a formal fix “hyper-racism,” his vision for accelerating the 
“explicitly superior” and already “genetically self-filtering elite” through a system of 
“assortative mating” that would offer a “class-structured mechanism for population 
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diremption, on a vector toward neo-speciation” (Land 2014). This is eugenics as a 
program for exit, not only from the progressive Enlightenment but also from the limits of 
humanity. Despite its contemporary jargon, this hyper-racism is indistinguishable in its 
form from late Victorian eugenics, which also recommended a program of “assortative 
mating.” Of course, now eugenics places us on a vector toward neo-speciation; so it’s 
back to the past, but now it’s futuristic.  
The “Cathedral” conspiracy justifies and motivates this recuperation of uncanny 
racism. Clearly, the “Cathedral” conspiracy shares much in common with rudimentary 
applications of Gramscian notions of hegemony or Hermann and Chomsky’s (1988) 
propaganda model. Ideology critique and reactionary critique tend to mirror one another. 
This is because both attempt to assign the uncanny object to a place, to contextualize it, 
whether as a justified response to the “Cathedral” or as a misguided response to left 
moralism. Reactionary thinking tends to fully indulge the critical impulse. Behind every 
veil, it finds the “Cathedral.”  This libidinal investment in unveiling resonates in the alt-
right obsession with “red-pilling” and cuckoldry. Just as neoreactionaries fear that the 
“Cathedral” faith promotes black dysfunction, the alt-right fears “blue-pilling” as a form 
of penetration by the Other. 
To those of us reared in the “Cathedral’s” halls, this is all repugnant. It is also 
uncanny: Haven’t we moved beyond this racism?  Of course, the alt-right has a memetic 
response to this critique: “I mean, come on people, it’s [current year].” The alt-right has 
fully anticipated critical unmasking and absorbed it into the meme form, which refuses 
symbolic decoding and provides a formal interface for the participatory reappropriation 
and bricolage that characterize media practice in this age of communicative capitalism. 
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Ideology critique and reactionary critique are similar in form: both attempt to recuperate 
the uncanny, to assign it a place. It is therefore crucial to attend to the uncanny form of 
reactionary ideology, which develops an immanent critique of the present in order to find 
a place in which to restore a lost past. Rather than following the alt-right to the purported 
excesses of identity politics, it is crucial to reckon with reactionary racism as the fulcrum 
of a proposed political order. This is not just a call to examine “structural racism,” 
because neoreactionary racism and alt-right racism have yet to harden into structure. It is 
instead a form, an interface between certain technical predicates (race as a gathering and 
sorting mechanism) and the social (the lost white future of the CEO-King). Reactionary 
ideology attempts to recuperate this uncanny racism; ideology critique must do more than 
cite the desire for this recuperation. 
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1 This work was supported by an Arts and Humanities Research Council grant for 
“Political Ideology, Rhetoric and Aesthetics in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the 
‘Alt-Right,’” (AH/R001197/1). 
2 As Nagle (2017) documents, Gabriella Coleman (2014) continued to write approvingly 
of 4chan as late as 2014, when the forum was dominated by extreme racism and 
misogyny, and she also celebrated the hacker “weev” despite his open Nazism (102-105). 
In her book on trolling, Whitney Phillips (2015) argues for the redeeming qualities of 
“racist statements forwarded by people whose stated goal is to be as racist and upsetting 
as possible” because, unlike more subtle racists, “at least trolls advertise” (97). Although 
Phillips is right to argue that there is no value in simply condemning trolls, it is similarly 
difficult to see the value in well-advertised racism. The history of celebratory studies of 
participatory culture weighs heavily on such accounts. 
3 The explainers cited in this paper all recount a version of Pepe’s history. For an 
academic treatment, see Marwick and Lewis (2017: 36). 
4 On “Dark Deleuze,” see Culp (2016). For a succinct account and critique of Land’s 
accelerationism see Noys (2014: 54-58). For more on the controversy surrounding Nick 
Land’s planned 2016 appearance at the London art gallery LD50 and the seminar series 
he offered in 2017 at the New Centre for Research and Practice, see Shutdown LD50 
(2017) and Anon (2017).  
5 This contradictory impulse to restore the past in the future is a key feature of fascism. In 
an analysis of National Socialism, Jeffrey Herf (1981) calls this “reactionary 
modernism.” 
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6 On HBD, Land and Moldbug’s sources include prolific eugenicist bloggers such as 
“hbd chick” and Steve Sailer, controversial popular genetics writers including Charles 
Murray and Nicholas Wade, and the physicist Stephen Hsu, whose recent interest in the 
genetics of intelligence has generated controversy (see Flaherty 2013). Galton, Land, and 
Moldbug share a similar strategy of racial typing. Galton adopted Quetelet’s use of the 
Gauss-Laplace distribution to identify physical generations in human populations, which 
Galton sought to index with racial categories (Galton 1869: xi, and Wozniak 1999). 
7Breitbart lists four articles under the “Curtis Yarvin” tag as of May 3, 2019. For the first 
defense of Yarvin’s presence at LambdaConf, which, incidentally, was published the 
same day as Breitbart’s alt-right explainer, see Bokhari (2016). 
